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S U M M A R  Y
One of the most important problems in the philosophy of science
is formed by the question, to rvhich extent scientific formulas and
signs can tell us something about realitv, and if in general our
theories can approximate reality as it is in itself. This problem of
truth in science is the problem of the relation between signs, theory
and reality.
-ït is the object of this work to give to this problem a satisfactory
solution, which is based on philosophical anthropology.
In the course of the last century many answers to these questions
have been proposed. Some of them have been discussed in chapter 2.
Irleopositiuisra conceives a scientific theory as a fabric of propositions,
which can be reduced partly to logical and mathematical tautologies,
partly to elementary propositions lvhich are verifiable by our sense-
organs. An elementary proposition is said to be tyu,e, when its
structure corresponds rvith that of a fact in reality. Thus a true
proposition is a representcttíon of the structure of a fact. Non-
verifiable propositions are said to be meaningless, e.g. the logical
and mathematical tautolosies.
This neopositivistic conCeption hor,vever leads to an unsolvable
difficulty. The criterion of meaningfulness of a proposition has such
consequences, that the statements of neopositivism itself must be
meaningless. The deeper cause of this difficulty is founcl in the tact,
that the problem of the relation between propositions (formulas) and
reality cannot be solved within the framervork of science or losrc
i tsel f.
The discussion of the lvork of BRrocuaN, MencBN,qu and Goxsnrs
demonstrates, that there cannot be a direct correspondence between
signcomplexes and reality. They are always separated from each
other by a constrttct, i.e. a structure-design, rvhich is the result of
human activity. A signcomplex is not a d.irect representation of a
structure in reality, but first of all of a structure rvhich is desiened
by man. Such structures make it possible for man to have a definite
vision on reality and to control and manipulate it in certain r,vays.
In the chapters 3, 4 and 5 an
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in chernistry, m,athematics and physics confirms the thesis mentioned
above. It is shown that a scientific theory is a structwre-system,,
designed by man, and consisting of a small number of species of
elements and relations between them. Within such a system it is
possible to design structures by putting together some of its elements
and relations. The structure-system is areiteration-systent,: he same
elements and relations are repeated in all structures which can be
designed. Sometimes there are several euels ol stntctwreinthesystem:
some complexes of the Íirst order are taken as elements to form
complexes of the second order, etc. Complexes of lower order are
called patterns.
In chemistry and physics only such systems are designed, as to
make it possible to conceive reality as a (isomorphic or homomor-
phic) model, of these systems. In mathematics hor,vever one is only
concerned rvith the reiteration-systens as such, especially with those
which can be axiomised and which have a deductive character.
The sigz-systems which are used in science consist of a small
number of species of object- and relation-signs, and are always
models of the structure-systems, to which they belong. By means
of sign-complexes, which are combinations of object- and relation-
signs, structures designed within the framework of a reiteration-
systern can be represented. This representation is essentialy an
identity of the designed structure with the spatial structure of the
sign-complex. The fabric of relations and elements of the represented
structure-desigr can be found again in the spatial arrangement of
the object- and relation-signs into a sign-complex.
In chapter 6 it is shown, that reitelation- and sign-systerns also play
an irnportant role outside the realm of science. Wherever a survey
andatechnical control over a certain domainis required, designment
and use of such systems are necessary. One should think of the writing
of notes in music, of the alphabet, of normalisation in technics, etc.
In addition to system-signs there is another kind of signs, which are
called t nditid u aI sigros : indications, symptoms, signals, gestures, also
the indication of a dial in the course of an exoeriment. Whereas
system-signs have no direct relation to the rópresented. reality,
individual signs fornr a concrete part of the situation, in which they
act as signs. By means of an individual sign one can design a centered
strwctu.re, in r,hich the sign is the centre, from this centre a number of
relations jump in severai directions, udrich connect it with other
elements. With such a centered structure orientation in the situation
is possible. Every element, every relation of the centered structure
and also the structure itself is iepeatable; reiteration-system and
centered structure are always interwoven with each other.
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Sometimes also phenomena such as images, expressions, symbols,
languages, etc. are called signs. Such a subsumption cannot be
maintained against a more accurate phenomenological analysis.
Many essential differences with system- and individual signs are
shown. In this book only these two kinds are designated by the
name,,sign".
A further analysis of the conception of structure makes it clear,
that structure and sign can only be understood, if one rses philo-
sophical, anthropology as a starting-point. The basis of this anthro-
pology is formed by PrassNnn's thesis of the eccentric posítion ol rnan.
Man is never totally absorbed in a situation, but keeps always a
certain distance to it; each situation, every object or element in it,
may be repeated elsewhere and at some other time; the situation is
one among many other possible situations. The human body is a
medium, by which contact with the world is possible, but at the
same time it is a thing among the other things in the world. Human
contact rvith the world has the character of indirect d'irectness.
With this anthropological thesis as a startingpoint, the following
principles of a philosophy of sign and structure can be derived:
Every contact of man rvith the world, every ,,Anschauung", i.e.
perception, conception, orientation, vision, survey, theory, etc. is
possible only by means of structure-systems and of centered
structures which are interwoven with these systems. The structures,
which are found in the world of perception, can be disengaged from
the perceived objects and facts; with the elements of these structures
one can design new structure-systems, and the centered structures
which are possible within these systems can be compared with those
of the percepted objects in the world. All structures have a spatial
character; therefore they are always tied to human sense-organs in
some way or other, even in the most abstract cases. Thus man must
represent he designed structures somehow, e.g. by means of sign-
complexes with a spatial order.
Chapter 8 gives a final analysis of the relation between sign,
structure and reality in science.
Starting with structures that are given to us in the percepted
world, science isolates a number of definite elements and relations;
with these a reiteration-system is designed, in which structures are
possible, that can be compared with partial structures in the per-
cepted world, by means of experiments. Now it is attempted to
underlie new systems to the first, so that finally there is a system
with several levels of structure; only those complexes, which are of








































percepted world, by means of experiments, which themselves are
àir"c["a by the system. Thus a theóry is never a passive imitation of
reality, but the result of creative activity of man'
only'complexes of the highest level of structure are comparable
with ihe structures in the world of perception. Verification of a
theory therefore is always indirect, fragmentary, partial and
apprJximate. Taking thesê restrictions into account' a theory is
,àia to be true, if tÉere is identity between the complexes of the
nighest level, which are possible with-in the theory' and selected
structures in the world of perception. In this case the representing
sign-complexes and formulas are true too' However' one should
nJver forget, that every theory is the result of a process ofselection'
and there"fore it can sháw us only a single aspect of the world.
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